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We examined whether automatic stimulus evaluation as measured by the Affect 
Misattribution Procedure (AMP) is moderated by the degree to which attention is assigned to 
the evaluative stimulus dimension (i.e. feature-specific attention allocation, FSAA). In two 
experiments, one group of participants completed a standard AMP while attending to 
evaluative stimulus information. A second group of participants completed the AMP while 
attending to non-evaluative stimulus information. In line with earlier work, larger AMP 
effects were observed when participants were encouraged to attend to evaluative stimulus 
information than when they were not. These observations support the idea that the impact of 
FSAA on measures of automatic stimulus evaluation results from a genuine change in the 
degree of automatic stimulus evaluation rather than a change in the degree to which automatic 




Effects in the affect misattribution paradigm are modulated by feature-specific attention 
allocation 
The capacity to select information as a function of task demands and (long-term) goals 
is an essential requirement for adaptive behavior. One mechanism that allows for such an 
automatic selection of goal-relevant information is feature-specific attention allocation 
(hereafter referred to as FSAA). It is the extent to which attention is assigned to one specific 
stimulus dimension (e.g., size, shape, color, etc.) or even one particular stimulus feature (e.g., 
large, circular, red, etc.) as a function of current goals and task-demands (Medin & Schaffer, 
1978; Nosofsky, 1986; also see Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Kiefer, 2012; Spruyt, De Houwer, 
Everaert, & Hermans, 2012). 
FSAA has been found to influence the degree to which participants process the 
evaluative meaning of task-irrelevant stimuli (e.g., Everaert, Spruyt, & De Houwer, 2013; 
Spruyt, De Houwer, & Hermans, 2009). As an example, consider the evaluative priming 
studies by Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, and Eelen (2007). In a typical evaluative priming 
experiment, participants are presented with a series of evaluative ‘target’ stimuli (e.g., a 
picture of a kitten), each of which is preceded by a brief presentation of an evaluative ‘prime’ 
stimulus (e.g., a picture of a corpse). Participants are usually asked to categorize the target 
stimuli according to their evaluative connotation (positive or negative) and to disregard the 
prime stimuli. Performance is typically better when the prime stimulus has the same 
evaluative connotation than when it has the opposite evaluative connotation of the target. This 
effect can come about only if participants process the evaluative connotation of the primes 
and can therefore be used as an index of automatic evaluation of the primes. Despite 
numerous studies attesting to the unconditional, automatic nature of this so-called ‘evaluative 
priming effect’ (Herring et al., 2013; Klauer & Musch, 2003), Spruyt and colleagues 
demonstrated that the occurrence of this effect is restricted to conditions that maximize 
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selective attention for the evaluative stimulus dimension. In their experiment, participants 
were asked to switch between two categorization tasks on a trial-to-trial basis: the (traditional) 
evaluative categorization task (i.e., positive vs. negative discriminations) and a non-evaluative 
semantic categorization task (i.e., animals vs. object discriminations). Crucially, one group of 
participants (i.e., the evaluative group) performed the evaluative categorization task on 75 % 
of the trials and the non-evaluative semantic categorization task on the remaining 25 % of the 
trials. Another group of participants (i.e., the non-evaluative group) performed the evaluative 
categorization task on just 25 % of the trials and the non-evaluative semantic categorization 
task on the remaining 75 % of the trials. As a result of the different base rates of the two 
categorization tasks, participants in the evaluative group were encouraged to maximize 
selective attention for the evaluative stimulus dimension whereas participants in the non-
evaluative group were encouraged to maximize selective attention for non-evaluative stimulus 
information. In line with the hypothesis that automatic stimulus evaluation depends on FSAA, 
a reliable evaluative priming effect was found in the evaluative group only (for related 
findings, see Gast, Werner, Heitmann, Spruyt, & Rothermund, 2014; Spruyt, 2014; Spruyt & 
Tibboel, 2015). 
Importantly, while this pattern of results may be sufficient to conclude that the 
evaluative priming effect can be dependent on FSAA (i.e., an observable phenomenon), it is 
insufficient to draw strong conclusions concerning the degree to which automatic stimulus 
evaluation is in general contingent upon FSAA (i.e., one of the processes underlying this 
phenomenon). For the evaluative priming effect to occur, two sequential steps need to occur. 
First, participants need to process the evaluative tone of the (task-irrelevant) prime stimulus to 
some extent. Second, the outcome of the prime-evaluation process needs to impact target 
performance by means of some mechanism. While such a mechanism can set in before the 
evaluative tone of a prime is processed completely, partial completion of the prime-evaluation 
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process is necessary before any second mechanism can be initiated (see Spruyt et al., 2011). 
Accordingly, the observation that the evaluative priming effect is dependent upon FSAA may 
in principle result from three different scenarios (see also Deutsch & Gawronski, 2009; Spruyt 
et al., 2011): (a) FSAA may impact the very process of automatic stimulus evaluation, (b) 
FSAA may impact task-specific processes that translate the outcome of the prime-evaluation 
process into an observable effect, or (c) FSAA may impact both the automatic evaluation 
process and task-specific processes that drive the evaluative priming effect. Accordingly, to 
validate the hypothesis that FSAA exerts an influence on automatic stimulus evaluation (i.e., 
scenario a or c), one needs to demonstrate that the impact of FSAA on automatic stimulus 
evaluation is not restricted to one specific measure of automatic stimulus evaluation. Instead, 
if the impact of FSAA on automatic stimulus evaluation replicates across a wide range of 
experimental tasks, each characterized by the operation of unique, task-specific processes, one 
can safely conclude that the observed effects of FSAA must be driven by a genuine 
modulation of the degree to which automatic stimulus evaluation occurs.
1
 
In line with this logic, Everaert et al. (2013) demonstrated that attentional capture by 
emotional stimuli, as measured with the emotional Stroop task and the dot probe task, occurs 
only if participants assign attention to the evaluative stimulus dimension. Similarly, Everaert, 
Spruyt, Rossi, De Houwer, and Pourtois (2014) showed that EEG correlates of early orienting 
responses towards rare, emotional stimuli were larger when the evaluative stimulus dimension 
was selectively attended to as compared to when a non-emotional stimulus dimension was 
selectively attended to. In sum, FSAA seems to modulate the very process of automatic 
                                                 
1
 There is currently an intense debate concerning the question whether effects in the standard evaluative priming 
paradigm can arise in the absence of overlap between the response set and the prime set (see Becker; Klauer; & 
Spruyt, in press; Klauer, Becker, & Spruyt, in press; Werner & Rothermund, 2013; Rothermund & Werner, 
2014; Spruyt, 2014; Spruyt & Tibboel, 2015). Crucially, this discussion concerns the mechanism(s) that translate 
the outcome of the prime-evaluation process into an observable effect (e.g., response compatibility, encoding 
facilitation, etc.), not the prime-evaluation process itself. Given that these mechanisms are not operative in the 
AMP, we refer the reader to the above-cited papers for an extensive treatment of this topic. 
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stimulus evaluation rather than the mechanisms that are at play in specific experimental 
paradigms. 
Nevertheless, this general conclusion is challenged by a series of recent studies in 
which the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) was used as a measure of automatic 
stimulus evaluation. In a typical AMP study, participants are asked to judge whether a briefly 
presented, neutral Chinese ideograph is more pleasant or less pleasant than the average 
Chinese ideograph (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). Crucially, each ideograph is 
preceded by the short presentation of an evaluative prime stimulus. Results consistently show 
that the (neutral) ideographs are more likely to be evaluated as being pleasant rather than 
unpleasant when they are preceded by a positive prime stimulus as compared to when they are 
preceded by a negative prime stimulus. Although the AMP is quite similar to the evaluative 
priming paradigm in terms of its procedural features, several studies suggest that both 
paradigms rely on different task-specific processes (e.g., Deutsch & Gawronski, 2009; 
Deutsch, Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009; Gawronski, Cunningham, LeBel, & 
Deutsch, 2010; Gawronski & Ye, 2014; Gawronski & Ye, 2015). While the evaluative 
priming effect is thought to result from processes operating at the response interference and/or 
target encoding stage (e.g., De Houwer, Hermans, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2002; Klauer, 
Roßnagel, & Musch, 1997; Klinger, Burton, & Pitts, 2000; Spruyt et al., 2007), it is typically 
argued that AMP effects result from an (unintentional) misattribution of the feelings evoked 
by the primes to the targets (e.g., Payne et al., 2005; but see Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2012). 
Recently, Gawronski and colleagues compared the evaluative priming task and the 
AMP with regard to their sensitivity to variations in FSAA (Gawronski et al., 2010; 
Gawronski & Ye, 2015). In both paradigms, the primes were face pictures that varied along 
two, orthogonal dimensions: race (black vs. white) and age (young vs. old). One group of 
participants (i.e., the race group) was asked to count how many prime pictures depicted black 
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or white faces and a second group of participants (i.e., the age group) was asked to count how 
many prime pictures depicted young or old faces. Participants in the race group were thus 
encouraged to assign selective attention to the race dimension while participants in the age 
group were encouraged to assign selective attention to the age dimension. When participants 
performed the evaluative priming task, Gawronski et al. (2010) observed a data pattern that 
was consistent with the results reported by Spruyt et al. (2007, 2009, 2012). Evaluative 
priming of race was found only when participants assigned attention to the race dimension 
while evaluative priming of age was found only when participants assigned attention to the 
age dimension. Moreover, indices of reliability and validity mirrored these observations, with 
priming effects showing greater reliability and validity for the dimension that was selectively 
attended to. In contrast, the priming scores of the AMP were found to be unaffected by the 
manipulation of FSAA. Both the race group and the age group showed similar AMP scores, 
reliability coefficients, and validity indices along both stimulus dimensions. 
To account for these divergent findings, Gawronski et al. (2010) argued “that the 
impact of unattended category cues [is dependent] on conditions inherent in specific tasks” (p. 
1008). That is, the divergent findings obtained with the AMP and the standard evaluative 
priming paradigm were ascribed to a differential impact of FSAA on task-specific 
mechanisms whereas automatic stimulus evaluation itself was assumed to be unaffected by 
FSAA (i.e., scenario b). Clearly, these results and their interpretation are in direct opposition 
to earlier studies showing an impact of FSAA on a wide variety of measures of automatic 
stimulus evaluation. 
It must be noted, however, that the procedures used to manipulate FSAA in the studies 
by Spruyt and colleagues were quite different from those used by Gawronski and colleagues. 
Most notably, in the studies by Spruyt and colleagues, participants were always encouraged to 
assign selective attention either to the evaluative stimulus dimension (e.g., positive vs. 
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negative) or to a non-evaluative control dimension (e.g., animal vs. object). In contrast, in the 
studies by Gawronski and colleagues, participants were encouraged to assign attention to 
either race or age, two dimensions that are intrinsically related to valence (e.g., Dovidio, 
Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; McConnel & Leibold, 2001; Rudman, 
Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999; Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glas, 1992; Taylor, Fiske, 
Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). Crucially, the AMP always induces selective attention for the 
evaluative stimulus dimension as it requires participants to make explicit evaluative 
judgments. It could be hypothesized that participants were encouraged to process both the age 
dimension and the race dimension because their inherent evaluative connotation was task-
relevant. It thus remains an open question whether a more traditional manipulation of FSAA 
(i.e., selective attention or stimulus valence vs. selective attention for a neutral stimulus 
dimension) might impact automatic stimulus evaluation as measured by the AMP. 
Accordingly, we ran two experiments in which the AMP was used to capture 
automatic stimulus evaluation under conditions that, consistent with our earlier studies, either 
promoted selective attention for the evaluative stimulus dimension or a non-evaluative 
stimulus dimension (e.g., Everaert et al., 2013; Spruyt, 2014; Spruyt et al., 2007, 2009, 2012). 
Similar to Spruyt et al. (2007), participants performed either the standard AMP or were asked 
to decide whether the target Chinese ideograph referred to an animal or an object (Experiment 
1), or a human or animal (Experiment 2). One group (i.e., the evaluative group) performed the 
standard AMP on 75 % of all trials and the aforementioned non-evaluative semantic 
categorization task on the remaining 25 %. The other group (i.e., the non-evaluative group), 
performed the non-evaluative semantic categorization task on 75 % of all trials and the 
standard AMP on the remaining 25%. The high proportion of standard AMP trials in the 
evaluative group and the semantic categorization task in the non-evaluative group encouraged 
participants to assign to attention to the evaluative stimulus dimension or a non-evaluative 
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stimulus dimension, respectively. We therefore predicted the evaluative group to have 
stronger AMP effects compared to the non-evaluative group, both in terms of overall effect 
size and the reliability of the measure.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Participants where 69 students at Ghent University who were sampled using an 
online recruitment system (10 men, 59 women, Mage = 22.8 years, SD = 4.7 years). All 
participants signed an informed consent form prior to participation. The experiment lasted 
approximately 20 minutes and was followed by a short, unrelated experiment. Participants 
were paid €5 in exchange for their participation. 
Materials. A set of 20 positive pictures (Mvalence = 7.97, SDvalence = 0.43) and 20 negative 
pictures (Mvalence = 2.49, SDvalence = 0.67) was selected from the IAPS database (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) to be used as primes in the experiment (see the Appendix for the 
picture numbers). A set of 200 neutral, Chinese ideographs, taken from Payne et al. (2005), 
was used as a target set. The ideographs were presented in white on a black background. All 
pictures were resized to have a height and width of 256 pixels and where presented in the 
center of the screen in a frame that had a height and width of 300 pixels. The lines of the 
frame were 20 pixels wide. The color of the frame could either be white or green and served 
as a cue for the task that participants were required to perform. 
All stimuli were presented against the black background of a 19-inch computer 
monitor with a 60-Hz refresh rate and a screen resolution of 1024 by 768 pixels. Stimulus 
presentation was controlled with a Dell Optiplex GX520 desktop computer running Affect 4.0 
(Spruyt, Clarysse, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2010). Responses were registered 
using a standard computer keyboard. 
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Procedure. Participants were assigned at random to the evaluative group (n = 37) or the non-
evaluative group (n = 32) and were tested individually in a dimly-lit room, either individually 
or in pairs. The sample size of both groups was slightly different because the experimenter 
assigned two participants to the evaluative group instead of the non-evaluative group by 
accident. The instructions stated that the aim of the experiment was to investigate the 
interpretation of foreign symbols in the presence of distracting stimuli. Depending on the 
color of the frame surrounding the Chinese ideograph (see below), participants were asked to 
judge whether they thought the symbol was less or more pleasant than the average symbol 
(i.e., the evaluative decision task) or referred to an animal or an object (i.e., the semantic 
decision task). In line with Payne et al. (2005), the prime pictures were explicitly described as 
irrelevant to the task at hand. 
Each of the 200 Chinese ideographs was presented once and each prime stimulus was 
presented 5 times. The total number of trials was thus 200 and the proportion of positive and 
negative primes was exactly 50 percent. Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation 
cross in the middle of the screen for 500 ms. Immediately after the offset of the fixation cross, 
a prime picture was presented for 5 refresh cycles of the computer screen (approximately 83 
ms) in the center of a white frame. After a stimulus onset asynchrony of 200 ms, the target 
ideograph was presented for 100 ms in the middle of a frame that could be either white or 
green. The presentation of the ideograph was followed by the presentation of a backward 
mask that depicted a noisy pattern of black and white pixels. 
The white frame surrounding the targets turned green on a set of 50 randomly selected 
trials (i.e., 25 %) containing an equal portion of positive and negative primes. Participants in 
the evaluative group were asked to perform the evaluative decision task when a white frame 
surrounded the target ideograph and to perform the semantic decision task when a green 
frame surrounded the target ideograph. Conversely, participants in the non-evaluative group 
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were asked to perform the semantic decision task when a white frame surrounded the target 
ideograph and to perform the evaluative decision task when a green frame surrounded the 
target ideograph. The participants in the evaluative group thus performed the evaluative 
decision task on 75 % of all trials while the participants in the non-evaluative group 
performed the evaluative decision task on just 25 % of all trials. 
Participants used the “a” and “z” key, and the “o” and “p” key on the standard 
AZERTY keyboard with their left and right hands, respectively, to perform the two tasks. The 
mapping of the tasks onto different hands was counterbalanced across participants. Similar to 
the procedure employed by Gawronski et al. (2010), an error message was presented for 2 
seconds after the response when participants responded after 1500 ms had elapsed (“!!!TOO 
SLOW!!!”), applied the wrong task (!!!WRONG TASK!!!), or both (“!!!WRONG TASK 
AND TOO SLOW!!!”). When the trial ended, an inter-trial interval was initiated that varied 
randomly between 500 ms and 1500 ms. 
Results 
Before proceeding with the analyses, data of 3 participants were excluded because 
their error rates exceeded the limit of 1.5 times the interquartile range above the third quartile 
of the distribution of the errors. As a result, the evaluative group consisted of 37 participants 
whereas the non-evaluative group consisted of 29 participants. Analyses were restricted to the 
standard (evaluative) AMP trials. Trials in which the wrong task was performed were 
excluded from the analyses (4.22 %). Trials with reaction times below 150 ms or above the 
response deadline of 1500 ms were removed from the dataset, as were trials in which the 
reaction time deviated more than 2.5 standard deviations from a participant’s mean reaction 
time in a particular condition (3.19 %; Ratcliff, 1993). 
Main analyses. A mixed effects approach was adopted for two reasons. First, the proportion 
of valid AMP trials was necessarily larger in the evaluative group (75 %) as compared to the 
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non-evaluative group (25 %). Second, as a result of the uneven distribution of AMP trials in 
both conditions, the number of AMP trials that required a task-switch was necessarily larger 
in the non-evaluative group as compared to the evaluative group. To take these between-
group differences into account, we performed a logistic mixed effects analysis wherein the 
binary response was regressed on the fixed factors prime valence (positive vs. negative), 
switch type (repetition vs. switch), and group (evaluative vs. non-evaluative). In addition, 
participants and prime stimuli were treated as crossed random effects (Baayen, Davidson, & 
Bates, 2008; Jaeger, 2008; Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012). Significance tests were performed 
using standard Chi-squared tests for mixed-effects models. It may be noted that the 
maximum-likelihood approach precluded the calculation of effect sizes. As an alternative, 
confidence intervals are reported where appropriate.  
The mixed-effects model yielded several significant effects (see Table 1, for the mean 
predicted probabilities). A highly significant main effect of prime valence revealed that 
participants were more likely to emit a positive response after a positive prime than after a 
negative prime (i.e., the AMP effect), 𝜒1
2 = 78.24, 𝑝 <  .0001. Crucially, a significant 
interaction between group and prime valence was observed, 𝜒1
2 = 10.37, 𝑝 =  .001. This 
interaction showed that the AMP effect was larger in the evaluative group than in the non-
evaluative group. The AMP effect, however, was significant in the evaluative group, 𝜒1
2 =
123.75, 𝑝 <  .0001, as well as the non-evaluative group, 𝜒1
2 = 28.00, 𝑝 <  .0001. Finally, a 
significant three-way interaction between group, switch type, and prime valence was 
observed, 𝜒1
2 = 4.36, 𝑝 =  .037, showing that the interaction between group and prime 
valence was present on the repetition trials, 𝜒1
2 = 10.17, 𝑝 <  .001, but not on the switch 
trials, 𝜒1
2 = 0.89, 𝑝 =  .34.  
Error analyses. Analysis of the proportion of errors (wrong task selection or slow responses) 
revealed main effects of group, 𝜒1
2 = 64.05, 𝑝 <  .0001, and switch type, 𝜒1
2 = 41.02, 𝑝 <
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 .0001. Higher error probabilities were observed in the non-evaluative group, ?̂? =
.074, 95% 𝐶𝐼 = (.052, .104) compared to the evaluative group, ?̂? = .015, 95%, 𝐶𝐼 =
(.011, .020) and in switch trials, ?̂? = .038, 95% 𝐶𝐼 = (. 028, .051), compared to repetition 
trials, ?̂? = .015, 95% 𝐶𝐼 = (.011, .020). The effect of prime valence did not reach 
significance nor did it interact significantly with other effects in the model, all 𝜒1
2𝑠 <
2.40, 𝑝𝑠 > 0.12. 
Reliability analyses. A bootstrapping approach was adopted to examine the reliability of the 
AMP effect, both across and within groups. For each of 10,000 runs, the data of an individual 
participant were split in two random sets. To ensure that these sets were (roughly) of equal 
size in both groups, all AMP data were used for participants in the non-evaluative group (i.e., 
50 trials) whereas a random subset of about 50 data points (i.e., 1/3 of all trials) was used for 
participants in the evaluative group. For each participant, the two sets were then used to 
calculate two AMP scores per participant, which were subsequently correlated and Spearman-
Brown corrected. Finally, the reliability coefficient was estimated by taking the mean of all 
correlations obtained. The sampling distribution of the correlations was used to perform 
further non-parametric statistical tests.  Overall, the reliability was high, 𝑟 =  .76, 𝑝 <  .0002, 
both in the evaluative group, 𝑟 =  .74, 𝑝 <  .0002, and the non-evaluative group, 𝑟 =
 .76, 𝑝 <  .0002. The difference between the reliability coefficients observed both groups was 
statistically unreliable, 𝑝 = .89. 
Discussion 
According to the FSAA framework developed by Spruyt et al. (2009; also see, Spruyt 
et al., 2007; Spruyt et al., 2012), automatic stimulus evaluation occurs only if and to the extent 
that attention is allocated to evaluative stimulus information. In line with this framework, we 
observed that automatic stimulus evaluation as measured by the AMP was more pronounced 
when participants were encouraged to selectively attend to evaluative stimulus information as 
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compared to when participants were encouraged to selectively attend to non-evaluative 
stimulus information. 
Our analyses also revealed that the modulation of the AMP effect by FSAA was much 
more pronounced on repetition trials as compared to switch trials. This finding is important as 
it seems to rule out rivaling interpretations in terms of task-switching effects. Assume, for 
instance, that participants were always inclined to perform the task that was presented on the 
majority of the trials (i.e., the evaluative task in the evaluative condition and the non-
evaluative task in the non-evaluative condition). If so, switching to the evaluative task must 
have been easier in the evaluative group as compared to the non-evaluative group, as task 
preparation has been found to make switching between tasks easier (e.g. Meiran, 2000, 
Monsell, 2003). One might thus expect the switch trials to produce more noisy data in the 
non-evaluative group as compared to the evaluative group, thereby potentially producing a 
reduced AMP effect in non-evaluative group as compared to the evaluative group. The 
present findings show, however, that the impact of FSAA on the AMP was more pronounced 
on the repetition trials as compared to the switch trials, not the other way around. We can thus 
safely rule-out the hypothesis that the observed impact of FSAA of the AMP effect was 
simply a by-product of task-switching effects. 
Experiment 2 
Whilst Experiment 1 revealed a clear-cut modulation of the AMP effect by FSAA, an 
additional experiment was performed, for a number of reasons. 
First, in Experiment 1, the nature of the required classification task was signaled by 
means of a green frame that was presented on the exception trials only. If it is assumed that 
the green frame was perceived as a go-signal, it may have interfered with a quick and efficient 
switching from the dominant to the non-dominant task. Alternatively, one could simply argue 
that participants may have been confused by the occasional presentation of an additional 
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stimulus on a small subset of trials. In both scenario’s, the  likelihood of obtaining a clear-cut 
AMP effect in the non-evaluative condition would be reduced, thereby producing an 
artifactual moderation of the AMP effect by FSAA. Accordingly, in Experiment 2, a frame 
was presented on all trials. The neutral color of this frame (i.e., purple vs. yellow) signaled 
which task was required on a given trial and the assignment of the frame color to the tasks 
was counterbalanced across participants. 
A second limitation of Experiment 1 concerns the nature of the prime set. As the 
primes varied on the evaluative stimulus dimension only, the results of Experiment 1 are 
insufficient to rule out the possibility that selectively attending towards the evaluative 
stimulus dimension increases misattribution effects in general rather than affect misattribution 
effects in particular. In this respect, it is important to point out that, according to the FSAA 
account, the impact of FSAA on the semantic analysis of task-irrelevant stimuli is by no 
means confined to the evaluative stimulus dimension. In principle, any stimulus dimension or 
stimulus feature can be prioritized as a function of concurrent goals and task-demands (see 
also Kiefer, 2010; Kiefer & Martens, 2012; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986). In line 
with this viewpoint, Spruyt et al. (2009) found significant (non-evaluative) semantic priming 
effects only when FSAA was directed towards a (non-evaluative) semantic stimulus 
dimension (e.g., animals vs. objects). Likewise, Everaert et al., (2013, Experiment 1) observed 
effects akin to the emotional Stroop effect for neutral semantic stimuli when participants were 
encouraged to attend selectively to a semantic stimulus dimension. However, both Spruyt et 
al. (2012) and Everaert et al., (2013, Experiment 2) failed to replicate this data pattern when, 
respectively, using a subliminal (sequential) priming procedure or a dot probe paradigm. It 
thus remains to be seen whether FSAA can impact non-evaluative misattribution effects. 
Accordingly, in the second experiment, the primes varied along two, orthogonal 
stimulus dimensions: the evaluative stimulus dimension (i.e., positive vs. negative) and a non-
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evaluative, semantic stimulus dimension (i.e., human vs. animal). Just like in Experiment 1, 
participants were asked to switch between an evaluative judgment task (i.e., the AMP) and a 
non-evaluative judgment task (hereafter referred to as the Semantic Misattribution Procedure, 
SMP). In this experiment, however, the nature of the non-evaluative judgment task (i.e., 
humans vs. animals) was related to the non-evaluative stimulus dimension of the primes that 
was manipulated. In line with prior work (e.g., Deutsch & Gawronski, 2009; Imhoff, Schmidt, 
Bernhardt, Dierksmeier, & Banse, 2011), we thus expected the response rates in the SMP to 
vary as a function of the primes. More specifically, we expected participants to select the 
response ‘human’ more frequently than the response ‘animal’ after the presentation of a 
person as a prime. Likewise, we expected participants to select the response ‘animal’ more 
frequently than the response ‘human’ after the presentation of an animal as a prime. In line 
with previous research, AMP effects were predicted to be larger in the evaluative group than 
in the non-evaluative group whereas SMP effects were predicted to be larger in the non-
evaluative group than in the evaluative group. Although no differences with regard to the 
reliability of the AMP were found in Experiment 1, we also examined whether the reliability 
of the AMP and the SMP was dependent on FSAA.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were 90 students at Ghent University who were sampled using an 
online recruitment system (58 women, 32 men, Mage = 21.9 years, SD = 3.0 years). All 
participants gave informed consent prior to participation and were paid €5. 
Materials. Both the evaluative stimulus dimension (positive vs. negative) and the semantic 
non-evaluative stimulus dimension (humans vs. animals) of the prime stimuli were 
manipulated by selecting 10 IAPS pictures for each of the following four stimulus categories 
(see the Appendix for the picture numbers): positive humans (Mvalence = 7.95, SDvalence = 0.34), 
positive animals (Mvalence = 8.10, SDvalence = 0.40), negative humans (Mvalence = 2.31, SDvalence = 
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0.64), and negative animals (Mvalence = 2.53, SDvalence = 0.72). The target set now included 260 
Chinese ideographs, of which 20 were used in the practice phase and 240 were used during 
the actual experiment. The 240 ideographs were paired randomly with the 40 prime pictures, 
which were presented six times each. The experiment was run on laptop computers connected 
to an external keyboard, mouse, and a 19-inch LCD monitor (60 Hz refresh rate, screen 
resolution 1024 × 768 pixels). In all other aspects, the materials of Experiment 2 were 
identical to those used in Experiment 1. 
Procedure. Participants were assigned at random to either the evaluative group (n = 46) or 
the non-evaluative group (n = 44). The experimental procedures used in Experiment 2 were 
virtually identical to those used in Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. First, the 
SMP required participants to indicate whether they thought the target symbols referred to 
humans or animals. Second, the color of the frame that signaled the task was purple for one 
task and yellow for the other task, with color assignment counterbalanced across participants. 
Third, to familiarize participants with the response assignments, we included a brief practice 
phase (20 trials) in which no primes were presented. Fourth, the actual experiment consisted 
of 240 trials (instead of 200). Each prime picture was presented exactly 6 times. Each of the 
240 ideographs that had not been presented during the practice phase was presented exactly 
once. In the evaluative group, the AMP was performed on 180 trials (75 %) while the SMP 
was performed on 60 trials (25 %). Conversely, the non-evaluative group performed the AMP 
on 60 (25 %) trials and the SMP on 180 trials (75 %). Different trial types were divided 
randomly across two 120-trial blocks, separated by a short, self-paced break. Finally, at the 
end of the experiment, participants were asked to use two 5-point rating scales to indicate (a) 
the extent to which they intentionally judged the primes instead of the targets and (b) the 
extent to which they felt influenced by the presentation of the primes (see Bar-Anan & Nosek, 




Due to an experimenter error, the data of 2 participants were unusable. Inspection of 
the error rates identified two participants whose error rates exceeded the limit of 1.5 times the 
interquartile range above the third quartile of the distribution of the errors. The final sample 
therefore consisted of 86 participants, 45 in the evaluative group and 41 in the non-evaluative 
group. Similar to Experiment 1, trials in which the wrong task was performed were excluded 
from the analyses (5.33 %). Trials with reaction times below 150 ms or above the response 
deadline of 1500 ms were removed from the dataset, as were trials in which the reaction time 
deviated more than 2.5 standard deviations from a participant’s mean reaction time in a 
particular condition (2.64 %). 
Main analyses. Separate mixed effects models were estimated for the AMP and the SMP (see 
Table 2 and Table 3, for the predicted means). For the AMP , the binary response was 
regressed on the fixed factors prime valence (positive vs. negative), switch type (repetition vs. 
switch), and group (evaluative vs. non-evaluative). For the SMP, the binary response was 
regressed on the fixed factors prime type (human vs. animal), switch type (repetition vs. 
switch), and group (evaluative vs. non-evaluative). In addition, similar to Experiment 1, both 
models included participant identity as a crossed random effect. Unlike Experiment 1, 
however, prime identity was not included as a crossed random effect as its associated variance 
was so small (s² < 0.05) that the model failed to converge for at least a subset of analyses. 
The analysis of the AMP data revealed a significant main effect of prime valence (i.e., 
the AMP effect), 𝜒1
2 = 168.61, 𝑝 <  .0001, that was qualified by a significant interaction 
with the group factor, 𝜒1
2 = 23.29, 𝑝 <  .0001. Replicating the results of Experiment 1, the 
AMP effect was larger in the evaluative group as compared to the non-evaluative group. 
Nevertheless, also similar to Experiment 1, the AMP effect reached significance both in the 
evaluative group, 𝜒1
2 = 343.16, 𝑝 <  .0001, and the non-evaluative group, 𝜒1
2 = 21.69, 𝑝 <
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 .0001. In contrast with the previous experiment, the three-way interaction between group, 
switch type, and prime valence did not attain significance, 𝜒1
2 = 1.08, 𝑝 =  .28. Finally, we 
also obtained a significant main effect of the group factor, 𝜒1
2 = 14.76, 𝑝 <  .001. 
Participants were more likely to emit a ‘positive’ response than a ‘negative’ response in the 
evaluative group compared to the non-evaluative group. A significant interaction between the 
group factor and the factor switch type, 𝜒1
2 = 11.55, 𝑝 <  .001, revealed that this group 
difference was more pronounced on switch trials than on repetition trials. 
A similar analysis of the SMP yielded a significant main effect of prime type, 𝜒1
2 =
159.38, 𝑝 <  .0001. The probability of the response ‘human’ was larger when the prime 
picture depicted a human than when the prime picture depicted an animal. As anticipated, this 
main effect of prime type was qualified by a significant interaction with the group factor, 
𝜒1
2 = 6.54, 𝑝 =  .011. To our surprise, however, the nature of this interaction effect was 
opposite to our predictions: the SMP effect was larger, not smaller, in the evaluative group, 
𝜒1
2 = 103.34, 𝑝 <  .0001, as compared to the non-evaluative group, 𝜒1
2 = 76.40, 𝑝 <  .0001. 
The three-way interaction between group, switch type, and prime type did not attain 
significance, 𝜒1
2 = 1.93, 𝑝 =  .16. Finally, participants tended to select the ‘human’ response 
more frequently in the non-evaluative group as compared to the evaluative group, 𝜒1
2 =
3.19, 𝑝 =  .074. A significant interaction between the group factor and the factor switch type 
indicated that this group difference was larger on switch trials than on repetition trials, 
𝜒1
2 = 4.34, 𝑝 =  .037.  
Error analysis. Additional analyses revealed that participants were more likely to execute the 
wrong task or to respond after the response deadline had already passed in the task that was 
less frequent, 𝜒1
2 = 79.44, 𝑝 <  .0001, and 𝜒1
2 = 74.81, 𝑝 <  .0001, for the AMP and SMP 
respectively. Likewise, more errors were produced on switch trials than on repetition trials, 
20 
 
both in the AMP and the SMP, 𝜒1
2 = 56.58, 𝑝 <  .0001, and 𝜒1
2 = 71.25, 𝑝 <  .0001, 
respectively. 
Reliability analysis. Reliability estimates were computed in the same way as for Experiment 
1. However, since more trials were available in the current experiment, two sets of 30 trials 
instead of 25 trials were randomly drawn for each simulation run. A high reliability 
coefficient was obtained for the AMP, 𝑟 =  .73, 𝑝 <  .0002. The reliability of the AMP was 
high in the evaluative group, 𝑟 =  .80, 𝑝 <  .0002, and moderate in the non-evaluative group, 
𝑟 =  .53, 𝑝 =  .0004. The difference between both reliability coefficients attained 
significance, 𝑝 =  .012. For the SMP, a high reliability coefficient was obtained as well, 
𝑟 =  .78, 𝑝 <  .0002. Contrary to our expectations, the reliability coefficient was high in the 
evaluative group, 𝑟 =  .83, 𝑝 <  .0002, and moderate in the non-evaluative group, 𝑟 =
 .69, 𝑝 <  .0002. The difference between both coefficients was not statistically significant, 
𝑝 =  .08. 
Discussion 
Replicating Experiment 1, the present experiment revealed a larger AMP effect when 
participants were encouraged to assign selective attention to evaluative stimulus information 
than when they were encouraged to assign selective attention to non-evaluative semantic 
stimulus information. Unlike Experiment 1, the present experiment also revealed that this 
modulation was equally strong on task-switch trials and repetition trials. The present 
experiment therefore adds further weight to the idea that the impact of our experimental 
manipulation on the AMP effect is not simply a by-product of task-switching effects. In 
addition, the present experiment confirms that the results obtained in Experiment 1 were not 
just a by-product of the fact that the (green) task cues were presented on exception trials only. 
Nevertheless, other aspects of the present data are difficult to reconcile with the FSAA 
framework initially developed by Spruyt and colleagues. In addition to the evaluative stimulus 
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dimension, we also manipulated a non-evaluative, semantic stimulus dimension (i.e., human 
vs. animal) and participants were asked to judge the targets in terms of this non-evaluative 
stimulus dimension on either the majority (i.e., the non-evaluative group) or minority of trials 
(i.e., the evaluative group). Based on the FSAA framework, we had expected that target 
performance in the non-evaluative task would be affected by the non-evaluative stimulus 
dimension to a larger extent in the non-evaluative group as compared to the evaluative group. 
However, the exact opposite was true. If it is assumed that the pattern of results obtained with 
the SMP are an accurate reflection of the degree to which participants engaged in automatic 
non-evaluative stimulus processing, the current findings seem to suggest that the requirement 
to adopt an evaluative processing mindset may enhance automatic semantic processing in 
general. We will elaborate on this intriguing possibility in more detail in the next section. 
General discussion 
According to the FSAA framework developed by Spruyt and colleagues (Spruyt et al., 
2007, 2009, 2012), the automatic semantic analysis of task-irrelevant stimuli is constrained by 
top-down attentional control (see also Kiefer & Martens, 2010). Whereas differences in terms 
of task-relevant stimulus dimensions are assumed to become highly salient, the automatic 
analysis of task-irrelevant stimulus dimensions is assumed to be reduced. In line with this 
framework, both in Experiment 1 and 2, we observed that the AMP effect was larger in 
participants who performed an evaluative categorization task on the majority of trials (i.e., the 
AMP) as compared to participants who performed a non-evaluative categorization task on the 
majority of trials (i.e., the SMP). Importantly, this effect is difficult to explain as a by-product 
of the requirement to switch between two tasks. First, in Experiment 2, the impact of the 
proportion of evaluative categorization trials on the AMP effect was found independently of 
whether participants completed a switch trial or a repetition trial. Second, in Experiment 1, it 
was observed that the proportion of evaluative categorization trials affected the AMP effect 
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on repetition trials only. While this observation shows that task-switch effects were at play in 
Experiment 1, the nature of this effect should have reduced (not enhanced) the impact of our 
experimental manipulation. Taken together then, the results of Experiment 1 and 2 seem to 
suggest, as hypothesized, that automatic stimulus evaluation as measured by the AMP is 
dependent upon the degree of attention assigned to the evaluative stimulus dimension. In line 
with this conclusion, we also observed that the reliability of the AMP effect was consistently 
high under conditions that promoted selective attention for the evaluative stimulus dimension 
(i.e., Experiment 1 and 2) and significantly smaller under conditions that promoted selective 
attention for a non-evaluative stimulus dimension (i.e., Experiment 2). 
One might note, however, that the AMP effect reached significance in both groups 
whereas earlier studies conducted at our lab typically revealed null-findings under conditions 
that promoted selective attention for non-evaluative stimulus information (Everaert et al., 
2011, 2013; Spruyt et al., 2007, 2009, 2012). This discrepancy can be readily explained, 
however, if one takes into account that the AMP, by definition, requires participants to assign 
selective attention to the evaluative stimulus dimension in order to comply with task-
demands. In addition, we manipulated prime valence in a salient manner, which in itself might 
be sufficient to encourage participants to attend to evaluative stimulus information 
(Duscherer, Holender, & Molenaar, 2008; Everaert et al., 2011).  
Other discrepancies between our findings and the literature, however, are more 
difficult to account for. First, while our findings show that the AMP effect depends upon 
FSAA, Gawronski and colleagues found no modulation of the AMP effect as a function of 
whether participants selectively assigned attention to the race or the age of persons depicted 
as primes (Gawronski et al., 2010; Gawronski & Ye, 2015). One way to account for these 
inconsistent findings concerns the nature of the procedures that were used to manipulate 
FSAA. In line with our earlier work (e.g., Everaert et al., 2011, 2013, 2014; Spruyt et al., 
23 
 
2007, 2009, 2012), we pitted selective attention for the evaluative stimulus dimension against 
selective attention for non-evaluative stimulus information. The use of two separable stimulus 
dimensions is important because it minimizes the likelihood that selective attention for one 
stimulus dimension affects the degree to which selective attention is assigned to the other 
stimulus dimension. In contrast, in the studies by Gawronski and colleagues, participants were 
required to attend to one of two stimulus dimensions that were both correlated with valence 
(i.e., race and age). If it is assumed that the requirement to adopt an evaluative processing 
mindset is sufficient to trigger selective attention for any stimulus dimension that is correlated 
with stimulus valence, the AMP findings reported by Gawronski and colleagues could, in 
principle, be accounted for. The same reasoning fails to deal, however, with the observation 
that Gawronski and colleagues did observe an impact of selective attention assignment in the 
standard evaluative priming paradigm. This discrepancy might be resolved, however, if one 
takes into account that participants who complete an AMP are sometimes inclined to judge 
the primes rather than the targets (e.g. Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2012; Eder & Deutsch, 2015). 
Such a process would interfere with the FSAA manipulation and might thus explain why 
FSAA manipulations have been less effective in the AMP as compared to the evaluative 
priming task. Further research would be required, though, to account for the full pattern of 
results obtained with the AMP and the evaluative priming paradigm. 
A second observation that is relatively difficult to account for concerns the results 
obtained with the SMP trials in Experiment 2. In theory, the attentional weighting of task-
relevant stimulus information should be a general phenomenon (e.g. Kiefer, 2012; Kiefer & 
Martens, 2010). Accordingly, although some attempts to demonstrate FSAA effects for non-
evaluative stimulus dimensions produced null-findings in the past (Everaert et al., 2013; 
Spruyt et al., 2012), we had predicted that the SMP effect would be more pronounced in 
participants who were encouraged to assign selective attention to the non-evaluative stimulus 
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dimension as compared to participants who were encouraged to assign selective attention to 
the evaluative stimulus dimension. The results showed, however, that the exact opposite was 
true. Likewise, it was observed that the reliability of the SMP effect was significantly smaller, 
not larger, in the non-evaluative group as compared to the evaluative group. Clearly, if it is 
assumed that that this data pattern is an accurate reflection of the degree to which participants 
engaged in automatic non-evaluative stimulus processing (see above), the FSAA framework 
has difficulty accounting for these observations as it predicts a facilitation of task-congruent 
stimulus processing only. It is also inconsistent with earlier work from our research team 
showing enhanced processing of non-evaluative stimulus dimensions that were task-relevant 
as compared to non-evaluative stimulus dimensions that were task-irrelevant (e.g., Everaert et 
al., 2013, Experiment 1; Spruyt et al., 2009).  
One way to account for the results obtained with the SMP relates to the nature of the 
selected stimulus materials. While care was taken to manipulate the evaluative stimulus 
dimension and a non-evaluative stimulus dimension in an orthogonal manner, one may argue 
that our choice to pit the category of humans against the category of animals was perhaps not 
the best decision. For instance, in the literature on animal welfare, it has been argued that the 
human/animal distinction might constitute an evaluative dimension, with animals becoming 
increasingly more negative as the degree of similarity with humans decreases (Batt, 2009; 
Plous, 1993). Moreover, there is ample evidence in the social cognition literature that the 
human/animal distinction is often used in stereotyping, with members of minority groups 
being characterized as less human and more animals-like than members of majority groups 
(e.g., Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005; Viki, Winchester, Titshall, & Chisango, 
2006). It could thus be argued that the manipulation of semantic category membership (i.e., 
humans vs. animals) was confounded with variations in evaluative stimulus information. 
Accordingly, one would predict the SMP effect in the present experiment to increase as the 
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broader experimental context promotes the use of evaluative stimulus information, as was 
observed. 
Alternatively, one may speculate that the requirement to focus selective attention on 
the evaluative stimulus dimension somehow led to a general increase of semantic stimulus 
processing. While this possibility was never envisaged in the initial papers by Spruyt and 
colleagues, it may be noted that a similar data pattern was reported by Becker et al. (2016). In 
a recent replication of one of the original studies by Spruyt et al.’s (2009), these authors re-
examined  the extent to which the semantic priming effects in the pronunciation task are 
dependent upon FSAA. Although none of the reported effects reached statistical significance, 
results showed an overall tendency for semantic priming effects (i.e., evaluative and non-
evaluative) to emerge under conditions that promoted selective attention for the evaluative 
stimulus dimension. Taken together then, it may be an inspiring exercise for future research to 
scrutinize the extent to and the conditions under which selective attention for the valence 
dimension may impact selective attention assignment to other stimulus dimensions. 
Irrespective of the unanticipated pattern of results obtained with the SMP, the present 
findings already have important implications. First, given that the AMP data revealed clear-
cut FSAA effects in the anticipated direction, the present findings add further weight to the 
hypothesis that automatic evaluation of task-irrelevant stimuli depends on FSAA (Spruyt et 
al., 2009). Second, given that the AMP effect is much more volatile than previously assumed, 
researchers are advised to take FSAA in account when using the AMP as a means to capture 
inter-individual differences in automatic stimulus evaluation. Not only can one expect FSAA 
to reduce or inflate differences between individuals, it may also influence the predictive 
validity of the AMP. More specifically, the degree to which a relationship can be found 
between AMP scores (registered at a time 1) and some outcome behavior (registered at a time 
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2) is likely to depend on the degree of overlap between the FSAA conditions realized at both 
test occasions. 
In conclusion, the present results demonstrate that automatic stimulus evaluation as 
measured by the AMP is less impervious to variations of FSAA than previously assumed. In 
addition, our findings suggest that selective attention for the evaluative stimulus dimension 
can enhance both evaluative and non-evaluative misattribution. Further research would be 
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Mean Predicted Probabilities (?̂?) of Positive Responses and 95 % confidence intervals as a 
function of Prime Valence (Positive vs. Negative), Switch type (Repetition vs. Switch), and 
Group (Evaluative vs. Non-evaluative) in Experiment 1. 
  
Prime Valence 





Switch Type Group ?̂? 95 % CI ?̂? 95 % CI 
 
M 95 % CI 
         
Repetition 
Evaluative 0.32 (0.27, 0.37) 0.72 (0.66, 0.76) 
 
0.40 (0.37, 0.43) 
Non-Evaluative 0.38 (0.29, 0.48) 0.59 (0.49, 0.69) 
 
0.22 (0.10, 0.34) 
         
Switch 
Evaluative 0.36 (0.30, 0.43) 0.66 (0.60, 0.72) 
 
0.30 (0.25, 0.36) 
Non-Evaluative 0.36 (0.29, 0.44) 0.61 (0.54, 0.69) 
 
0.27 (0.20, 0.33) 
         
Total 
Evaluative 0.33 (0.28, 0.39) 0.70 (0.65, 0.75) 
 
0.37 (0.34, 0.40) 
Non-Evaluative 0.38 (0.30, 0.46) 0.60 (0.52, 0.68) 
 
0.23 (0.15, 0.31) 






Mean Predicted Probabilities (?̂?) of Positive Responses and 95 % confidence intervals in the 
AMP as a function of Prime Valence (Negative vs. Positive), Switch type (Repetition vs. 
Switch), and Group (Evaluative vs. Non-evaluative) in Experiment 2. 
  
Prime Valence 





Switch Type Group ?̂? 95 % CI ?̂? 95 % CI 
 
M 95 % CI 
Repetition Evaluative 0.40 (0.36, 0.44) 0.67 (0.63, 0.71)  0.27 (0.24, 0.30) 
 
Non-Evaluative 0.42 (0.35, 0.49) 0.51 (0.44, 0.59)  0.10 (0.01, 0.19) 
Switch Evaluative 0.48 (0.42, 0.53) 0.72 (0.67, 0.76)  0.24 (0.20, 0.29) 
 
Non-Evaluative 0.36 (0.30, 0.41) 0.50 (0.45, 0.56)  0.15 (0.10, 0.20) 
Total Evaluative 0.43 (0.39, 0.47) 0.69 (0.65, 0.72)  0.26 (0.24, 0.28) 
 
Non-Evaluative 0.40 (0.34, 0.46) 0.51 (0.45, 0.57)  0.12 (0.05, 0.18) 







Mean Predicted Probabilities (?̂?) of Human Responses and 95 % confidence intervals in the 
SMP as a function of Prime Type (Animal vs. Human), Switch type (Repetition vs. Switch), 
and Group (Evaluative vs. Non-evaluative) in Experiment 2. 
  
Prime Type 





Switch Type Group ?̂? 95 % CI ?̂? 95 % CI 
 
M 95 % CI 
Repetition Evaluative 0.40 (0.34, 0.47) 0.60 (0.54, 0.67)  0.20 (0.11, 0.29) 
 
Non-Evaluative 0.44 (0.40, 0.48) 0.61 (0.57, 0.65)  0.17 (0.14, 0.20) 
Switch Evaluative 0.37 (0.32, 0.41) 0.60 (0.55, 0.65)  0.24 (0.19, 0.29) 
 Non-Evaluative 0.50 (0.45, 0.55) 0.63 (0.58, 0.67)  0.12 (0.07, 0.17) 
Total Evaluative 0.39 (0.34, 0.44) 0.60 (0.55, 0.65)  0.21 (0.16, 0.27) 
 
Non-Evaluative 0.46 (0.42, 0.50) 0.61 (0.58, 0.65)  0.15 (0.13, 0.18) 







IAPS picture numbers in Experiment 1 
Positive: 1440, 1460, 1463, 1500, 1604, 1610, 1620, 1710, 1750, 1920, 2057, 2165, 2311, 
2345, 2550, 2655, 4641, 5831, 7325, 7330. 
Negative: 1200, 1220, 1300, 1930, 2120, 2692, 2750, 2800, 2900, 3230, 6570, 8230, 9000, 
9040, 9041, 9280, 9340, 9440, 9530, 9570. 
IAPS picture numbers in Experiment 2 
Positive humans: 2070, 2304, 2311, 2340, 2341, 2530, 2550, 7325, 8461, 8496. 
Positive animals: 1440, 1460, 1463, 1500, 1600, 1604, 1620, 1710, 1750, 1920. 
Negative humans: 2120, 2750, 2800, 2900, 3022, 3230, 6250, 8230, 9040, 9041. 
Negative animals: 1052, 1111, 1220, 1274, 1280, 1300, 9181, 9561, 9570, 9571. 
